Approved For Release 2001/07/24 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000700020022-7

1. Background

- a. Pearl Harbor and the impetus to fix the intelligence organizations
- Single agency versus recognition of a need for departmental intelligence
- Requirement leadership and evaluation -- the requirement of a federal intelligence system
- 2. The Five Major Statutory Responsibilities of the DCI
 - a. To advise on intelligence activities
 - b. To make recommendations for their coordination
 - c. To produce national intelligence
 - d. To perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally
 - e. To perform other functions as directed
- 3. Origins and Meaning of the Term "Services of Common Concern"
 - a No precedent
 - b. The CIG Unit: "Central Intelligence Service" Unit
- 4. Restrictions on Establishing Such Services
 - a. NSC must direct
 - b. The IAC must approve
 - c. The DCI has an injunction that the purpose of such coordination for which the Act was drawn should be primarily to strengthen the over-all governmental intelligence structure and that primary departmental requirements should be recognized and receive the cooperation and support of the CIA

5. Generalizations from Experience

- a. That the major efforts of the DCI's recommendations for the coordination of activities have resulted in the establishment of services of common concern (these now constitute the major portion of his total organization).
- b. That the DCI should so conduct and manage certain other responsibilities as to permit their possible evolution into services of common concern.
- c. That with the assignment to perform services of common concern there is a companion responsibility to coordinate the activities involved (this responsibility being distinct from the responsibility to recommend to the NSC with respect to coordination).
- d. That those activities which have been specifically assigned by the NSC as services of common concern have to date included both intelligence information collection and support activities on the one hand, and intelligence production on the other.
- e. Factors which led to the assignment to the Agency to perform services of common concern are:
 - 1) The services were marginal, but not dispensable, to the intelligence needs of individual departments, and yet were recognized to be of value to the comprehensive intelligence system.
 - 2) Being marginal to individual departments, such services might be adversely affected by limitations on departmental budgets and personnel ceilings and by competition with other departmental programs of higher priority.
 - 3) Duplication of effort and danger of security breach were inevitable results of not performing the service centrally.
 - 4) The scattered efforts did not ensure that the products would be available to all who needed them.

- f. Those services of common concern which affect primary departmental responsibilities the least have been the easiest for CIA to administer, insofar as relations with the other departments are concerned.
- g. That it is not always possible or even desirable to establish a service of common concern that is preclusive of other agencies participation in phases of the same activity.

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-4-



7. 00/C

- a. Detail and why
- b. State suggestion for investigation -- 1946
- c. Coordination antedates the service of common concern
 -- the importance of the central machine index of
 sources
- d. The committee -- means of advice
- e. The license

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8. SCIENTIFIC

- a. Only directive which refers to paragraph four of the ACT.
- b. Primary not exclusive
- c. Smoss

9. Clandestine

- a. Not preclusive. Recognizes need of theater for operational purposes
- b. Problem of agreed activities
- c. IAC subcommittee for guidance

10. Defectors

a. Not separate services of common concern but refinements of the contacts and collection responsibilities

11. Economics -- 15

a. To produce economic intelligence not provided by other agencies in their discharge of regular departmental missions and assigned intelligence responsibilities and to fulfill requests of the IAC. This directive does not clearly provide for an integrated approach to economic intelligence in the community and more needs to be accomplished toward this goal.

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b. The EIC

- 12. Handling of Foreign Language Materials -- 16
 - a. Not considered a service of common concern
 - b. In development for five years -- importance of post mortem on China
 - c. Other agencies not excluded from activity
 - d. The Advisory Committee as a condition as well as an assistance
- 13. Possibly Emerging Services of Common Concern

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- b.
- c. OSI
- d. Sovmat

Conclusion:

- 26. At the outset, I theorized that the drafters of the National Security Act could have solved the government's intelligence problem by creating a single intelligence agency to meet all the needs of the government. That they did not is clear from the Act, and why they did not is, I trust, evident from what I have been saying.
- 27. They did, however, create a new agency, and they gave it the deceptive name "CENTRAL Intelligence Agency." This is a deceptive name because this Agency is central only in that it is the center of an interrelated system of interdependent intelligence agencies. It's leader, the DCI, is responsible for providing leadership to the community in the highest sense. It is also "central" in one other sense, namely: insofar as it performs services of common concern, about which I trust we now know a little more. A wider understanding of this limited character of this Agency's "centralness" could do much to limit our own disappointment that we do not do more and our friends' possible concern that we do too much.